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Human behavior is an underlying cause for many of the ecological crises faced in the
21st century, and there is no escaping from the fact that widespread behavior change is
necessary for socio-ecological systems to take a sustainable turn. Whilst making people
and communities behave sustainably is a fundamental objective for environmental
policy, behavior change interventions and policies are often implemented from a
very limited non-systemic perspective. Environmental policy-makers and psychologists
alike often reduce cognition ‘to the brain,’ focusing only to a minor extent on how
everyday environments systemically afford pro-environmental behavior. Symptomatic of
this are the widely prevalent attitude–action, value–action or knowledge–action gaps,
understood in this paper as the gulfs lying between sustainable thinking and behavior
due to lack of affordances. I suggest that by adopting a theory of affordances as a
guiding heuristic, environmental policy-makers are better equipped to promote policies
that translate sustainable thinking into sustainable behavior, often self-reinforcingly, and
have better conceptual tools to nudge our socio–ecological system toward a sustainable
turn. Affordance theory, which studies the relations between abilities to perceive and act
and environmental features, is shown to provide a systemic framework for analyzing
environmental policies and the ecology of human behavior. This facilitates the location
and activation of leverage points for systemic policy interventions, which can help
socio–ecological systems to learn to adapt to more sustainable habits. Affordance
theory is presented to be applicable and pertinent to technically all nested levels of
socio–ecological systems from the studies of sustainable objects and households to
sustainable urban environments, making it an immensely versatile conceptual policy
tool. Finally, affordance theory is also discussed from a participatory perspective.
Increasing the fit between local thinking and external behavior possibilities entails a deep
understanding of tacit and explicit attitudes, values, knowledge as well as physical and
social environments, best gained via inclusive and polycentric policy approaches.
Keywords: ecological psychology, affordance theory, pro-environmental behavior, attitude–action gap,
environmental policy, socio–ecological systems, nudging, radical embodied cognitive science
INTRODUCTION
Human behavior is a common determinant underlying most of the major ecological crises of the
21st century, and there is simply no escaping from the fact that behavior needs to be changed
for socio-ecological systems to take a sustainable turn (Steg and Vlek, 2009; Antal and Hukkinen,
2010). Yet whilst making people and communities behave pro-environmentally is one of the
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fundamental targets of environmental policy, this foundation is
surprisingly often left unspoken, or at least understood from a
very limited, non-systemic, perspective. The aim of the present
article is to elaborate pro-environmental behavior change policy
and intervention analysis by introducing a theory of affordances
to the environmental policy community. Affordance theory,
which interprets environmental behavior from a dynamical and
coupled systems or ecological approach (Gibson, 1979), is shown
to be a promising heuristic for systemic behavior analysis.
Particularly, it can help policy-makers locate and make use of
‘leverage points,’ or places where small changes can lead to
large shifts in a system’s behavior, for systemic behavior change
interventions (Meadows, 1997, 2008; Lockton, 2012). This can
help not only individuals, but whole socio–ecological systems to
learn to adapt to more sustainable habits.
Affordances are defined in this paper as the ‘relations
between abilities to perceive and act and features of the
environment’ (Chemero, 2009, p. 150). As Guagnano et al. (1995)
and Jackson (2005) note, such integrative approaches, which
take into account the dynamical relations between ‘internal’
and ‘external’1 behavior antecedents, have traditionally been
lacking. I argue therefore that a theory of affordances has a
particularly valuable niche to occupy within the multidisciplinary
field of environmental policy, since it effectively crosses
the artificial divide between internal and external behavior
antecedents and studies the dynamical and coupled systems
relations between human actors and their (physical and socio-
cultural) environment. Moreover, affordance theory invites us
to study how this behavior system, as a whole, ‘unfolds over
time’ (Chemero, 2013, p. 149). This, in turn, accounts for a
more complete picture of environmental behavior and helps
us understand why pro-environmental knowledge, values or
attitudes are not alone sufficient to induce behavior change (the
attitude–action gap), or why everyday environments fail to make
the full use of our internal behavior potential. This is particularly
relevant since the overwhelming consensus is that despite many
or even most of us having pro-environmental attitudes, we are
not behaving sustainably (Blake, 1999; Kollmuss and Agyeman,
2002; Abrahamse et al., 2005; Kennedy et al., 2009; Steg and Vlek,
2009).
In the present text, these mismatches between internal
and external behavior antecedents are analyzed in terms
of affordances, and it is suggested that by increasing pro-
environmental affordances we can facilitate systemic and even
self-reinforcing pro-environmental behavior change. Moreover,
it is also argued below that an affordance-based approach
to behavior change intervention can make the best use of
the pre-existing latent pro-environmental behavior potential
of both humans (capabilities to act, including attitudes,
values, knowledge etc.) and everyday environments. This seems
1I acknowledge here, at the very beginning of this text, that the use of the terms
‘internal’ and ‘external’ imply a dichotomy that, ontologically speaking, simply
does not exist (it is a ‘false dichotomy’; Gibson, 1979). Indeed, this paper is devoted
to show that they are not dichotomous, and are instead mutually implicative
and systemically relative (there is no internal without external). However, due to
linguistic insufficiencies I maintain that a cautious upholding of this dichotomy is
necessary for pragmatic purposes.
to call for a thorough understanding of latent behavior
potentials of local populations, suggesting that affordance-based
governance should be polycentric (or decentralized), inclusive
and participatory, reducing local helplessness and increasing
social acceptability.
The crux of this article is therefore to make a case for adopting
a theory of affordances as a guiding heuristic for environmental
policy. With a heuristic, I mean a fast instrumental and
conceptual tool which facilitates ‘exploring and conceptualizing’
pro-environmental behavior, also helping us to ‘identify points
of policy intervention’ (Jackson, 2005, vi). A successful heuristic
facilitates quick decision-making and helps avoid costly errors.
By adopting a theory of affordances as a guiding heuristic, I
argue that policy-makers and scholars are better equipped to
systemically analyze the ecology of pro-environmental behavior,
understand the dynamics between its internal and external
antecedents, as well as design appropriate policy interventions.
Adopting the definition from Steg and Vlek (2009, p. 309),
environmental behavior is defined in this paper as ‘all types
of behavior that change the availability of materials or energy
from the environment or alter the structure and dynamics
of ecosystems or the biosphere.’ Pro-environmental behavior
(abbreviated hereafter as PEB), correspondingly, ‘refers to
behavior that harms the environment as little as possible, or
even benefits the environment’ (ibid.). The question of what
exactly counts as pro-environmental and what does not is not
problematized further within the scope of this paper. However,
it is worth emphasizing that harming the environment as ‘little
as possible’ is not necessarily pro-environmental and that pro-
environmental behavior in one domain or context might emerge
as unsustainable in another.
The body of this article is divided into three main sections.
Firstly, in section “The Attitude–Action Gap, or Why We Don’t
‘Walk the Talk”’ the attitude–action gap and its relevance to
environmental policy is briefly discussed. Particularly, I suggest
that, all too often, pro-environmental behavior research has
limited its focal variables to either internal (e.g., values, attitudes,
personal norms, habits, and knowledge) or external (e.g., physical
infrastructure, economic factors, and institutions) ones (see
Jackson, 2005 for an overview). I argue that to overcome the
barriers between pro-environmental motivations and behavior,
we must understand how our everyday environments provide
or constrain the actualization of our pro-environmental internal
factors. This requires the simultaneous and dynamical inspection
of both internal and external behavior antecedents, as well
as particular focus on how these dynamics evolve over time
(Chemero, 2013). In section “A Theory of Affordances,” drawing
particularly on ecological psychology (e.g., Gibson, 1979) and
recent advances in radical embodied cognitive science (e.g.,
Chemero, 2009), I argue that a theory of affordances provides
an effective heuristic framework for studying these coupled and
dynamical human–environment behavior systems. In section
“Affording Sustainability” I discuss the policy-relevance and
potential applications of affordance theory, where affordances
can be utilized as leverage points to induce systemic behavior
change. In section “Affording Sustainability” I also include a
brief meta-empirical survey of how affordance-like ideas have
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been implemented in environmental policy and psychology, and
discuss how intentional adoption of a theory of affordances can
hasten the arrival at well-functioning policies at various nested
systemic levels. Section “Conclusion” concludes the article.
THE ATTITUDE–ACTION GAP, OR WHY
WE DON’T ‘WALK THE TALK’
It is widely accepted amongst those studying pro-environmental
behavior (PEB) that a significant gap lies between possessed
values, knowledge and attitudes and behavior (Blake, 1999;
Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Abrahamse et al., 2005; Jackson,
2005; Kennedy et al., 2009; Steg and Vlek, 2009). In other words,
an attitude–action gap, a knowledge–action gap or a value–action
gap exists between internal human factors and behavior patterns.
For practical purposes, I from here on refer to this discrepancy
between internal factors (such as attitudes, values, knowledge,
personal norms, intentions and emotions) and behavior simply
as the attitude–action gap, humbly acknowledging that this does
a disservice to the great body of research focused on studying
the relationships between these individual internal factors and
pro-environmental behavior (see Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002;
Abrahamse et al., 2005; Steg and Vlek, 2009 for an overview on
the topic).
The attitude–action gap does not imply that internal factors
do not have any effect on pro-environmental behavior, but
rather that a great amount of PEB cannot be explained with
internal factors alone. Generally, it seems that internal factors
are more likely to lead to change in low-cost (low in time
and effort) actions than in high-cost behavior (Kollmuss and
Agyeman, 2002; Abrahamse et al., 2005; Steg and Vlek, 2009),
although not all research fully supports this (e.g., Hunecke et al.,
2001). Moreover, the case seems to be that internal factors
seem to correlate more strongly with behavior when they are
specific to a certain domain. This is, perhaps, common sense:
positive recycling attitudes strongly predict recycling behavior
(and not, for example, travel behavior), whilst more generic pro-
environmental values do so only to a much lesser extent (Vining
and Ebreo, 1992).
The attitude–action gap is, at the root of it, rather intuitive.
Many people with pro-environmental intentions will have
experienced the uncomfortable feeling of cognitive dissonance
when they have taken part in environmentally harmful yet
seemingly banal activities such as air travel. Simply, as Vining
and Ebreo (1992, p.1604) observe, ‘it is easier to be concerned
about the environment than it is to act on one’s convictions.’
This mundane and banal phenomenon, however, takes on direct
policy relevance when combined with an urgent need for humans
to change their behavior patterns and habits to tackle ongoing
ecological crises. We talk the talk, but systemically fail at
‘walking the talk’ (Kennedy et al., 2009). Since significant portions
of national populations are pro-environmentally motivated,
translating these latent pro-environmental behavior potentials
into action becomes an imperative task for environmental
policy. For one example, Kennedy et al. (2009) found that
Canadians adhere much more strongly to the ‘New Ecological
Paradigm’ world-view (which states, inter alia, that ‘humans and
other species are intricately connected’) than to the so-called
‘Dominant Social Paradigm’ (‘mankind was created to reign over
the earth’).
A comprehensive literature review on the attitude–action
gap is beyond the scope of this article. Fortunately, such work
has already been done, notably by Kollmuss and Agyeman
(2002), Abrahamse et al. (2005), Jackson (2005), and Steg and
Vlek (2009). Briefly, however, it should be noted that studies
on the relations between mental models and behavior have
progressed significantly from the oldest and simplest models
known as ‘rational,’ ‘linear,’ or ‘information-deficit’ models,
which established a direct linear relation between knowledge,
values and behavior. More complex and nuanced models have
taken into account how attitudes, norms, beliefs, intentions,
emotions, affect, altruism, locus of control, self-identity and
a large variety of other variables influence pro-environmental
behavior, also including sociological factors, situational variables
and, to a somewhat limited extent, the structural and physical
environment (Steg and Vlek, 2009, p. 314).
I argue, however, that many of these accounts on
pro-environmental behavior – important as they are for
understanding the complexities of human practices – suffer from
a very fundamental a priori assumption, which limit cognition
‘to the brain’ (Rockwell, 2005). In this paradigm, often implicit
in environmental psychology, contextual factors, if considered
at all, have usually been ‘introduced in the form of subjectively
perceived environment,’ and not as systemic ecological situations
(Hunecke et al., 2001). Moreover, when the effects of external
(such as economic) factors on behavior have been studied,
it has often been done so with the cost of excluding internal
human factors. Integrative approaches, which take to account
the dynamical coupling between internal and external behavior
variables, have traditionally been scarce (however, see Guagnano
et al., 1995; Stern, 2000; Hunecke et al., 2001; Jackson, 2005).
This is, of course, traceable to a long tradition of Cartesian
materialistic thinking, often implicit in the psychological and
cognitive sciences (Heft, 2001; Rockwell, 2005; Chemero, 2013;
Ch. 7 in Reed, 1996). That is, the notion that behavior and
cognition are ecological, construed dynamically in an ecological
system, is most often downplayed in favor of more limited
approaches which reduce cognition and behavior to the internal
domain (e.g., mental representations). Whilst this might be a
pragmatic and even useful limitation at times, treating human
cognition as a ‘static’ entity, ontologically separable from outside
variables, can also be wildly misleading (Kurz, 2002, p. 269). What
is suggested below is that rather than focusing on single static
variables underlying behavior we should take a dynamical stance,
such as that provided by a theory of affordances.
Affordance theory originates from the field of empirical and
theoretical research known as ecological psychology. Ecological
psychology draws mainly from perceptual psychologist James
J. Gibson’s work (most influentially Gibson, 1979), which
emphasizes the dynamical and systemic coupled relations
between animals and their physical environment. As used
in this text, ecological psychology should not be confused
with environmental psychology or other strains of research
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going by the name of ecological psychology (such as Roger
Barker’s), although many similarities between these fields exist
(see Heft, 2001 for a useful overview). I argue that ecological
psychology and its more recent descendants in radical embodied
cognition theories (e.g., Chemero, 2003, 2009, 2013 as well as
Rockwell, 2005) should be revisited in order to understand more
comprehensively the role our everyday and urban environments
play in shaping our environmental behavior. This is elaborated
in detail in sections “A Theory of Affordances” and “Affording
Sustainability” in the form of a theory of affordances.
A few caveats are in place before moving onward. I am not
proposing a silver bullet to solve the problem of the attitude–
action gap altogether. As Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002, p. 248)
rightly note, the gap is ‘such a complex one that it cannot
be visualized in one single framework or diagram.’ This is
wholly unsurprising from a systems theoretical point of view,
where it is generally understood that no static conceptualization
or model can capture the whole complexity of a contingent
system (Meadows, 2008). Indeed, to map the complete causality
underlying a behavior system is practically impossible, since it
would take an astronomical scale (Rockwell, 2005). Accordingly,
‘there will always be something of a tension between simplicity
and complexity’ in modeling behavior, and a ‘good conceptual
model requires a balance between parsimony and explanatory
completeness’ (Jackson, 2005, p. 23, vi). Therefore, what is merely
suggested below is that a theory of affordances provides us with
a pragmatic (see Rockwell, 2005) and adaptable heuristic for
understanding and intervening with behavior from a systems
perspective. Such a heuristic not only facilitates and hastens the
arrival at working policy solutions, but also importantly helps us
avoid unintended consequences and making costly mistakes. For
now, in section “A Theory of Affordances,” however, it is in place
to provide a more detailed description of what exactly we mean
when talking about a theory of affordances.
A THEORY OF AFFORDANCES
An affordance, in its simplest – yet most philosophically
impoverished – definition, refers to the action possibilities
provided by objects or environments. Whilst, as is elaborated
below, the concept is in fact significantly more nuanced than
this, the aforementioned definition of affordances has been
widely adapted by, for instance, the design community: ‘when
used in this sense, the term affordance refers to the perceived
and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental
properties that determine just how the thing could be possibly
used’ (Norman, 2002, p. 9). It follows then, that a chair provides
support and thus affords2 humans with (or ‘is for’) sitting. Apples
afford, among a huge variety of behavior, throwing, eating,
2The transitive verb to afford, in the whole of this text, should be read to imply
the meaning ‘to make available, give forth, or provide naturally or inevitably’ (as
defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary). This should not be confused with
the more common definition ‘to be able to bear the cost of ’ something. The noun
affordance is a neologism coined by ecological psychologist James J. Gibson (see
e.g., Gibson, 1979) and, of course, refers merely to the former definition of the verb
‘to afford.’ To cite Gibson (1979, p. 127) himself, ‘The verb to afford is found in the
dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something
baking and cutting. Bananas afford – explaining their huge
urban popularity – easy, fast and locally clean eating as well as
exportability, since they ripen after picking.
However, a more nuanced treatment of affordances does not
consider affordances as properties of objects or environments,
but rather in terms of ecological situations. As Chemero (2003,
2009) remarks, affordances are functionally meaningful features
of whole situations. These whole situations are better defined
as fluctuating behavioral fields emerging from brain–body–
world interaction (Rockwell, 2005, 2010). Here, the similarity to
Lewin’s (1951) field theory, a theory positing human behavior
as “a function of a dynamical ‘field’ of internal and external
influences,” is obvious (Jackson, 2005, p. 26; see also Heft, 2001).
Affordances from this more refined perspective are not – contra
the popular understanding (see e.g., Kurz, 2002; Norman, 2002) –
dispositional properties of things or environments, but rather
functionally meaningful ‘relations between abilities to perceive
and act and features of the environment’ (Chemero, 2009, p. 150;
c.f. Turvey, 1992). The environment here is to be understood
to refer to the whole of the material world, physical, cultural
and social environments included. This is the definition of
affordances used in the remainder of this text.
Affordances are therefore dynamical and coupled organism–
environment relations, hence through and through systemic and
ecological (Chemero, 2009). A chair, given the right conditions,
affords sitting for an erect bipedal species such as ours, whilst
its affordances are wholly different for other species not adapted
to walk and sit. Affordances are therefore not ‘psychologies
of things’ (contra Norman, 2002), but rather psychologies of
organism–environment relations. Affordance theory posits that
active cognitive agents perceive and experience the world in
terms of affordances, or functionally meaningful relations with
the environment. We do not perceive the world passively as
having pre-given objective and action-neutral properties, but
rather as active opportunities for action (Ramstead et al., 2016).
Our everyday lives are ridden with affordances, and they are
continuous, dynamic, reciprocal and evolutionary processes:
affordance-sets constantly affect organisms and populations,
whilst organisms continuously adapt to and modulate the niches
(or sets of affordances) they inhabit (Heft, 2001, xxix; Chemero,
2003, p. 190; Reed, 1996, p. 26).
The ontology of affordances is therefore one which attempts
to effectively cross the artificial subject–object divide (Chemero,
2009).3 This is perhaps best captured by the following oft-cited,
yet slightly cryptic, quote by Gibson (1979, p. 129):
that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term
does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.’
3I suggest that affordances are best interpreted via an anti-Cartesian ontology,
which does not separate subjects from objects. Good candidates for such an
ontology can be found in early American pragmatism, for instance the works
of John Dewey (e.g., Dewey, 1958) and William James (see Heft, 2001). This is
no coincidence, since Harry Heft’s (Heft, 2001) brilliant exposition on ecological
psychology reveals James’ radical empiricism’s direct influence on James J. Gibson’s
ecological psychology. Common to these perspectives is the ontological priority
of processes over substances, sometimes labeled ‘process metaphysics’ or ‘process
philosophy’ (Rescher, 1996, 2000). For an introduction to process philosophy see
the work of Nicholas Rescher (Rescher, 1996, 2000), and for an interpretation of
process philosophy in the context of environmental policy, see Kaaronen (in press).
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‘an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective
property; or both if you like. An affordance cuts across the
dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand
its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a
fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither.
An affordance points bothways, to the environment and to the
observer.’
Whilst this might seem unnecessarily muddling and
counterintuitive to some – or even violative toward the law
of non-contradiction (viz. ‘neither an objective property nor a
subjective property’ or ‘both if you like’) – Gibson’s definition
contains a valuable insight: when understood ecologically,
behavior is not constrained to the perceiver nor to the perceived,
but is rather a dynamical and coupled systems relation between
the perceiving organism and the environment it inhabits. From
this perspective, it is distasteful to reduce cognitive systems to
the brain (or even body), but cognition and behavior rather
emerge over time from a ‘dynamical brain–body–world nexus’
(Rockwell, 2005; Anderson et al., 2012; Hutto and Myin, 2012).
Hence affordances imply a degree of extended cognition: the
perceived world is not construed by the brain or mind, but
rather emerges from the interaction between a nervous system,
a body capable of perceiving and an environment which affords
perception (via, for example, latent information in the form
of structured ambient light in the environment) (Gibson,
1979; Reed, 1996; Chemero, 2003, 2009; Rockwell, 2005, 2010;
Anderson et al., 2012). Affordance theory implies that meaning
is not construed by the brain alone (by any means of ‘mental
gymnastics’), nor is it merely a social construct, but rather is
latent in the environment and (directly) perceivable in organism–
environment interactions (see the ‘radical embodied cognitive
science’ of Chemero, 2003, 2009). In contrast to inferential
theories of perception, where ‘meanings arise inside animals,
based on their interactions with the physical environment,’
affordance theory suggests that ‘the animal simply gathers
information from a meaning-laden environment’ to actualize
some function (Chemero, 2003, p. 181; see also Gibson, 1979,
p. 238–263). Meaning, cognition, perception, and thus also
behavior, are thoroughly ecological. Hence, of course, ecological
psychology.
Importantly, as Gibson’s quote above implies, affordances
are not idealistic (in the ontological sense), and despite their
hardly tangible nature, affordances are indeed real, perceivable
and empirically observable (Chemero, 2003, 2009; Heft, 2003;
c.f. Kurz, 2002 who, among others, claims affordances are mere
subjective perceptions). Chemero (2003, p. 187) suggests that for
us to understand affordances we should consider the ‘taller-than’
in the statement ‘Shaquille is taller than Tony.’ The taller-than
is neither a property of Shaquille or Tony, yet it is still an
empirically observable and real relation in the whole situation.
Affordances are equally real. To further elaborate, Chemero
(2009, p. 150), drawing on Dennett (1998), likens affordances
to the state of being ‘lovely’: a hippopotamus can continue
to have the potential for being lovely even when it is not, at
that moment, observed by another organism. In other words,
the hippopotamus’ physical structure has latent potential to
be lovely for a potential observer, even if the affordance of
‘being lovely’ is only actualized when complemented by another
organism which has the abilities to perceive and experience
its latent loveliness, given that the right conditions are met.
Affordances are, as Chemero (2003, p. 193) notes with dry wit,
‘lovely.’
Our everyday lives make use of innumerable affordances even
when we are not conscious of them (I would argue that we
mostly are not), and affordances do not require us to be able to
consciously locate them. Take for instance Polanyi’s (1958/1974,
1966/2009) well-known example that we can, without effort,
recognize familiar faces without being able to explicate how we
achieve this (i.e., familiar faces afford recognition).4 A similar
tacit use of affordances is illustrated by the so-called ‘gaze
heuristic,’ by which humans (and, it seems, dogs) can catch flying
objects unconsciously (and without any mental gymnastics such
as trajectory calculation) by simply fixing their gaze on the object,
starting to run, and adjusting running speed so that the angle
of the gaze remains constant (see the ‘ecological rationalism’ of
Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012). The ‘catchability’ affordance of an
object is, therefore, specifically an active organism–environment
relation. Moreover, to tacitly recognize affordances is no trick
unique to humans; all organisms are evolutionarily adapted to
their ecological niche and can make sense of the affordances
within it. Charles Darwin, who made less famous advances in
animal perception, noted how earthworms very delicately adapt
to the affordances within their ecological niche (see Reed, 1996,
p. 20–28; Darwin did not, of course, use the term ‘affordance’).
We do not need to consciously recognize affordances to make
use of them – certainly earthworms do not, at least not
to our human standards of consciousness. However, we can
knowingly identify and recognize affordances sufficiently for us
to modulate them, as will be discussed in section “Affording
Sustainability.”
In this section I have asserted that organism–environment
relations are coupled and dynamical systems. For our purposes,
this means that human cognition and behavior are, on an
ontological level, formed simultaneously, continuously and
dynamically from both internal (organismic) and external
(environmental) behavior potential. Moreover, affordance theory
implies that we not only study the way external and internal
factors cause changes in behavior, but rather ‘the way the
system as a whole unfolds over time’ (Chemero, 2013, p. 149).
Figure 1 illustrates this as a coupled and dynamical feedback
system. The rationale for modeling environmentally significant
behavior in such a non-linear fashion, with potential for positive
feedback (this is returned to in the following section), stems
from affordance theory’s recent resurgence in radical embodied
cognitive science, which attempts to describe psychology by
combining ‘non-linear dynamical modeling with ideas about the
nature of the mind’ (Chemero, 2013, p. 145; see also Rockwell,
4Interestingly, Polanyi’s philosophy of tacit knowing seems to have, to some extent,
influenced Gibson (1979, 22, 260–261). Drawing on Polanyi, Gibson notes that
knowledge can be said to be both tacit and explicit, but that there has to be a tacit
‘awareness of the world’ before it can be explicated (‘put into words’); ‘perceiving
precedes predicating’. Gibson continues: ‘However, skilled an explicator one may
become one will always, I believe, see more than one can say’. See also Kaaronen
(in press) for discussion on sustainability, M. Polanyi and affordances.
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FIGURE 1 | The dynamical and ecological behavior system.
2005 and Chemero, 2009). This is necessary since, as Chemero
(2013, p. 148) continues, it ‘is only for convenience (and from
habit) that we think of the organism and environment as separate;
in fact, they are best thought of as forming just one non-
decomposable system.’
Here we can identify a processual scheme dynamically
interconnecting ‘internal factors,’ ‘behavior capabilities’ (e.g.,
socio–physical abilities to act) and ‘external factors.’ Importantly,
this behavioral process is not linear, but all events (arrows) of
the process are interconnected and active simultaneously and
constantly. To paraphrase Gibson (1979, p. 240), behavior is a
flux and not a sequence – a continuous evolutionary act which
is ceaseless and unbroken. Behavioral systems are ‘processual’
and not discrete (in terms of process philosopher Rescher, 1996,
2000) or ‘loopy,’ and not ‘linear’ (as per enactivists Hutto and
Myin, 2012: 6 or Varela et al., 1991). The ecological behavior
system is dynamical (it evolves continuously) and coupled (its
constitutive parts are interconnected, and a change in one
variable results in changes in the others). This situation model
in Figure 1 represents, essentially, a self-organizing coupled
dynamical system where ‘the river molds the banks and the banks
guide the river’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 83). Whilst Figure 1 presents
internal and external factors as collections of variables, we could
also choose this model to analyze dynamics between specific
internal and external variables. Note also that whilst affordances
are generally taken to refer to merely the arrow connecting
external factors to abilities, I have also chosen to use the verb
‘afford’ to connect internal behavior potential with abilities. After
all, the latent structure of internal factors affords individuals
with behavioral abilities, even if not always to the same force as
the structure of external factors. This figure is returned to with
practical examples in the following sections.
I argue below that the notion that our everyday worlds are
infused, often unknowingly to us, with innumerable affordances,
takes on a very political nature. Whilst affordance theory is
generally considered a realistic or naturalistic description of
organism–environment relations, it can, and arguably should,
also be politicized. What kinds of affordances do we reinforce,
foster and inhibit, and how is this reflected in everyday behavior
patterns? More precisely, how (if at all) do the most prevalent
features in our socio–ecological system afford pro-environmental
behavior, and are available affordances equal for different
populations? Affordance theory presents us a framework for
studying the ecology of human behavior, and particularly
for focusing on how our everyday and urban environments
systemically nudge individuals and local populations to behave
in environmentally significant patterns and habits. A better
understanding of local behavior potentials (internal and external)
and their dynamics over time can facilitate the design of
urban and everyday environments which help to actualize
these potentials, resulting at best in self-reinforcing systemic
learning patterns. This would suggest for local, decentralized
(or polycentric) and even participatory governance, where
policy-designers are more specifically attuned to local behavior
potentials and capabilities. An imperative question arises here
for those involved with environmental policy. How do we, as
a society and culture, as individuals, as local communities, as
policy-makers, afford sustainability? These issues are elaborated
in the following sections.
AFFORDING SUSTAINABILITY
Having outlined the conceptual aspects of a theory of affordances,
it is now time to consider its policy-relevance. I have suggested
above that environmental policy-makers should adopt affordance
theory as a guiding heuristic for policy development, particularly
to understand the attitude–action gap in environmental behavior
and target policy interventions to induce systemic behavior
change. An efficient and coherent heuristic is more than a
semantic advantage; a good heuristic model can shape the
way in which we intuitively perceive the world and therefore
promptly aid policy- and decision-makers in identifying points
for policy intervention, hastening the arrival at working-as-
intended policies and helping to avoid costly (in time, effort and
money) mistakes (Jackson, 2005).
Since affordance theory provides us with a through-and-
through systemic understanding of environmentally significant
behavior, focusing on the dynamics between internal and external
behavior antecedents, it helps us locate systemic leverage points
(Meadows, 1997, 2008; Lockton, 2012) for policy intervention.
Leverage points are here to be understood as ‘places in the
system where a small change could lead to large shift’ in the
system’s behavior (Meadows, 2008, p. 146). Since environmental
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behavior is a coupled and dynamical system which evolves over
time (see Figure 1), by making use of leverage points policy-
makers have the capacity to help this system learn to behave more
sustainably. This is in Bateson’s (2000) terms deutero-learning
(learning to learn), in other words inducing second-order change
to the system to complement the usual first-order trial and
error (environmental behavior as usual). By understanding and
leveraging these feedback loops, we can, again quoting Bateson
(2000, p. 274), ‘not only solve particular problems but also form
habits which we apply to the solution of classes of problems.’
A central task for environmental policy-makers and scholars
is therefore to help our socio–ecological system – not just its
individual constituents – to learn to behave more sustainably.
What follows is an attempt to describe such systemic learning.
To understand the attitude–action gap in terms of a theory
of affordances, we should begin with asking why our everyday
niches do not afford sustainable behavior. Here Norman’s (2002)
insights from cognitive science and design are of direct relevance
for environmental policy. Norman (2002, p. 51) suggests that two
‘Gulfs’ separate internal mental states from being complemented
by external physical ones, namely the Gulf of Execution and the
Gulf of Evaluation.
The first of these gulfs is the Gulf of Execution, which exists
when the actions provided by a system do not match those
intended by a person, or when a system does not allow a person
to execute the intended actions directly and without significant
effort (Norman, 2002). In the case of the attitude–action gap
then, this would equal to a person with high pro-environmental
intentions (let us signify this here with INT+, for internal factors)
yet with low action possibilities provided by their ecological niche
(EXT−, for external factors).
The second gulf Norman (2002, p. 51) specifies is the Gulf
of Evaluation. The Gulf of Evaluation exists when a system
does not provide physical representations that can be directly
perceived and interpreted in terms of intentions and expectations
of a perceiver. In other words, the Gulf of Evaluation exists
during lack of functionally meaningful feedback. For this Gulf
to be crossed, the amount of effort that a person must exert to
‘interpret the physical state of the system’ must be low and the
person must be able to determine how well their expectations and
intentions are met. Systems should provide information that is
easy to acquire and interpret, and match the way in which the
person perceives the system. Because ‘people generally do not
know which and whose behaviors significantly affect resource
use,’ or at least such knowledge is bound to be vague and
filled with misunderstandings, feedback is important from an
educational point of view, giving instructions for future behavior
(Steg and Vlek, 2009, p. 310). A system intended to overcome the
attitude–action gap must therefore not only provide simple and
comparative feedback, but also provide functionally meaningful
‘feedforward’ (‘how to act from here on’) (Lockton, 2012).
Consider now, drawing back on Figure 1, the attitude–action
gap in terms of dynamical and coupled human–environment
relations, or affordances. If a population’s pro-environmental
internal set (values, knowledge, attitudes etc.) is high (INT+)
and we are witnessing a lack of behavior, the heuristic answer
per a theory of affordances would be that the niche does not
provide sufficient affordances for the actualization of the internal
sustainability potential (thus EXT−). Most likely, this is due to
insufficient action possibilities (Gulf of Execution) and feedback
(Gulf of Evaluation).
Now, consider that by policy means we cross the Gulfs
of Execution (make the system afford physical actions) and
Evaluation (make the system provide feedback/feedforward).
In other words, we alter our niche to have better capacities
for actualizing our latent pro-environmental potential, thus
increasing sustainable affordances. This would particularly entail
intervening with the strong leverage point in Figure 1 (‘External’
behavior potential → Behavior capabilities, or altering the
material aspects of the environment). Now we have a coupled
feedback loop of INT+ and EXT+. With the increase of
affordances in our niche (via EXT+), the latent potential of INT+
can be actualized. That is not to say that intervening with the
weak leverage point (see Figure 1) is unnecessary here, since
abilities to utilize any external factors also have to be taught and
learned – the case is merely that without the strong leverage
point being activated (e.g., recycling being physically possible) no
amount of weak leveraging will suffice.
A case example demonstrating such a positive sustainable
feedback loop between internal and external factors would be
a couple, call them Alfa and Beta, both possessing high pro-
environmental attitudes and knowledge (INT+), and thus high
latent potential for recycling, living in a suburban environment
without easily accessible recycling systems (EXT− due to a Gulf
of Execution; e.g., inconvenient drop-off recycling locations).
Note also that their waste disposal system provides no feedback
or feedforward as to how they are acting or how they should
act (EXT−). To remind Alfa and Beta (say, via information
campaigning) about their unsustainable action is unlikely to
substantially change behavior, and it might at worst result
in Alfa and Beta experiencing cognitive dissonance and thus
blocking the dissonant information or delegating responsibility
elsewhere (by means of self-justification).5 Now, imagine a
local environmental policy-maker, after surveying the local
populations’ environmental perceptions and identifying latent
pro-recycling attitudes, deploys each household in the suburb
with easily accessible curbside recycling systems (crossing the
Gulf of Execution).
Alfa and Beta now have affordance for recycling (EXT+
and INT+). Moreover, since it is now convenient for them to
recycle, the very act of recycling is likely to strengthen their pro-
environmental identities and attitudes. One explanatory theory
for this is the theory of cognitive dissonance, which suggests
that humans have a tendency of adjusting attitudes to conform
to behavior patterns (Cooper, 2007). This increase in internal
behavior potential makes it possible now for Alfa and Beta
to further adjust their ecological niche and fit their everyday
environments with less wasteful affordances (e.g., by altering
5In fairness, it should be acknowledged that cognitive dissonance could, at best,
result in Alfa and Beta going through excess measures to recycle (i.e., adjust
behavior to match values), although it is arguably more likely that they take the
‘path of least resistance’. As Cooper (2007, 8) notes, ‘the relative ease of changing
one’s attitudes rather than one’s behavior has made dissonance more relevant to
attitudes than to any other concept.’
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the prevalence of certain products and appliances). This again
reinforces their pro-environmental identities, and so on. Whilst
the recycling example is a mundane one (and arguably a minor
factor in the global ecological crisis), it is one of the more
researched fields of PEB and therefore serves the purpose here
to illustrate such cyclic systemic learning patterns. Steg and Vlek
(2009, p. 312) note, accordingly with the logic of Figure 1,
that the ‘introduction of recycling facilities may result in more
positive attitudes toward recycling (e.g., because it is more
convenient), and positive attitudes may in turn result in higher
recycling levels.’6 Vining and Ebreo (1992, p.1604) research on
recycling similarly concludes (inter alia) that increased recycling
opportunities (implementation of curbside recycling) not only
significantly increased recycling behavior but also led to an
increase in positive ‘global environmental’ and ‘specific recycling’
attitudes, thus ‘strengthening already positive environmental
attitudes.’ Guagnano et al.’s (1995) study also concluded that
having a curbside bin increased pro-environmental recycling
behavior (by reducing barriers between latent pro-recycling
attitudes and action) and, importantly, awareness of the social
and environmental consequences of recycling. Moreover, a
similar feedback loop (or ‘positive interactive cycle’) has also
been found by Kyttä (2003, p. 98, Kyttä, 2004) in studies on
child-environment relationships: a child-friendly environment
‘allows a positive interactive cycle to develop between a child
and the environment’ where ‘actualized affordances for their part
motivate the child to move around more in the environment,
which creates more possibilities for new affordances to become
actualized.’
Basically, we have here the potential for systemic leveraging,
where by actualizing a sufficient number of pro-environmental
affordances (by intervening with the strong and weak leverage
points of Figure 1) we can reinforce the pro-environmental
identities and motivations of populations, which again further
spurs PEB and potentially even further spontaneous pro-
environmental modulation of everyday environments. In such a
case we can imagine the behavior system in Figure 1 running
smoothly, and to an extent self-reinforcingly, evolving over
time toward more sustainable habits. For Reed (1996), the
whole notion of culture arises from this kind of bootstrapping,
where the agglomeration and proliferation of certain types of
affordances forms a ‘field of promoted action,’ which spurs
new practices, ideas/inventions and socio-cultural interactions.
This is also known as the ‘ratchet-effect,’ or the notion
that human socio-technological culture accumulates (often
irreversible) modifications over time (Tomasello, 1999; Tennie
et al., 2009). This ‘cultural ratchet’ of cumulative learning, of
course, also involves the social dimensions of teaching, social
imitation and norm conforming (Tennie et al., 2009). We are
6This is similar to the concept ‘virtuous circle’ (or ‘foot-in-the-door’) in social
psychology. For example, children who perceive themselves as being generous
because of a previous act of (even haphazard) generosity are more likely to continue
to behave generously (Tavris and Aronson, 2015). This is predicted by the theory of
cognitive dissonance: when someone behaves in a certain manner, they are likely
to afterward self-justify the previous behavior in order to maintain consonance
(Festinger, 1957). Sustainable behavior can lead to sustainable thinking (and vice
versa) in a ‘virtuous circle’ or sustainable feedback loop.
no longer dealing here with individual organism–environment
relations, but rather a ‘rich landscape of affordances’ (Rietveld
and Kiverstein, 2014) which promotes certain social practices (see
Shove et al., 2012) and reinforces what Ramstead et al. (2016)
have recently called ‘shared expectations’ or ‘local ontologies’ of a
population (behaving in ways which others expect one to behave).
These shared expectations and local ontologies are embodied
at various levels from brain networks, cultural artifacts and
constructed environments, which further reinforce enculturated
practices (ibid.).
For instance, when enough people are incentivized to recycle
and the built environment supports this behavior (i.e., recycling
is systemically afforded), it becomes a normalized social and
cultural practice, or a cultural affordance, where we expect others
to expect us to recycle (see section “Object-Level Affordances”
for a case example). A cultural affordance in this context
refers to the possibilities for action which depend on the
skillful leveraging of ‘explicit or implicit expectations, norms,
conventions, and cooperative social practices’ (see Ramstead
et al., 2016, 3; although more specifically, Ramstead et al. call this
a ‘conventional’ cultural affordance). The principal lesson here for
those involved with environmental policies is therefore that by
actualizing, or locating and activating in large enough numbers
what I have called systemic leverage points, the recycling case
being only one of innumerable possibilities, we not only promote
individual sustainable behaviors but also reinforce the emergence
of sustainable pro-environmental sociocultural practices and
hasten the transition toward a more sustainable culture. This
implies that we are essentially helping our socio–ecological
system to learn more sustainable habits. A central task for those
involved with environmental policies therefore emerges as the
need to redesign our ecological ‘niche,’ or ‘designer environment’
(Ramstead et al., 2016), so that its rich landscape of affordances
systematically promotes pro-environmental behavior. In such an
ecological niche, pro-environmental behavior would emerge in
many respects as the path of least resistance and the default form
of life.
That is not to say that these positively reinforcing feedback
loops would go on forever, since they would eventually settle
down to, or oscillate around, some relatively steady state,
depending on the availability of affordances, or be disrupted by
external forces. Moreover, a single feedback loop might not spill
over to other PEB domains (e.g., from recycling to increased
bicycling), or at least current research is very dubious as to
whether or not this is the case: spillover effects have been reported
to be both positive (PEB in one domain leads to a PEB in another)
and negative, where, quite concerningly, PEB in one domain
rebounds as a lack of PEB in another (Truelove et al., 2014).
The case seems to be, though, according to Truelove et al.’s
(2014, p. 132) meta-empirical review, that “those who engage in
a PEB because their environmental identity has been activated
will be likely to exhibit positive spillover because the participants’
role will get reinforced and strengthened as the result of the
initial decision.” Contrarily, external coercing of PEB might
have a converse effect. This suggests that we should particularly
make our everyday environments afford sustainable actions that
reinforce pre-existing latent pro-environmental internal factors,
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making us perceive that we are (knowingly and willingly) acting
in consonance with our pro-environmental identities and not
enforced or coerced by external authorities to do so.7 This is a
relevant observation for environmental policies, where behavior
interventions should particularly be implemented in domains
where significant latent pro-environmental behavior potential
(e.g., attitudes or knowledge) exist. Here, the provision of
material environments which afford PEB has higher potential
to lead to spillover effects and positive feedback loops in PEB.
Moreover, since pro-environmental internal factors are, in many
respects, pre-existing unutilized resources (as exemplified by the
attitude–action gap), their actualization is also a cost-effective
way of inducing pro-environmental behavior and habits.
Making the best use of affordances as leverage points is
a fascinating opportunity for those involved in environmental
policy and behavior interventions, although any applications
must be preceded by a thorough understanding of system
dynamics. Simplistic ‘if-you-build-it-they-will-come’ or ‘one
size fits all’ policy approaches are insufficient for identifying
leverage points (see Ostrom, 2010 for criticism on such top-
down approaches), since affordances are transactional. To
make the full use of these self-reinforcing feedback loops
and sociocultural ratcheting processes, we need to understand
which external structures complement a certain population’s
set of internal factors. This calls for local, decentralized and
perhaps even participatory policy approaches, where local
behavior potentials (internal and external) are thoroughly
charted before the implementation of behavior change strategies.
This also a political reasoning for not defining affordances
as uniform ‘properties’ of things or environments, since
physical environments can afford environmentally significant
behavior patterns very unequally. Affordance theory takes
on a very political nature here, and must be particularly
sensitive toward socioeconomic factors and behavior capabilities.
Firstly, individuals might have variety in their ability to
utilize affordances and transform resources into valuable
activities. Second, the distribution of environmentally significant
affordances might be fundamentally unequal between local
populations and socio-economic groups (see the ‘capability
approach’ of, e.g., Sen, 1995 for similar arguments). For instance,
targeting costly information campaigns or ‘blaming strategies’ at
non-recycling low-income families might be unfairly patronizing
if recycling affordances are scarce to begin with (Jackson, 2005,
p. 54). Moreover, ‘fetishizing’ actions such as recycling – to which
less fortunate populations might have less affordances – at the
expense of letting ‘political minefields’ such as air travel off the
hook is certainly questionable on moral and political grounds (see
Capstick et al., 2015).
Therefore, affordance theory seems to quite naturally call
for polycentric (Ostrom, 2010), local and inclusive governance
7A complicating factor here is that it seems that high-cost PEB is more likely
to promote positive spillover PEB than low-cost behavior (Truelove et al., 2014).
This makes sense from a cognitive dissonance perspective: when a person is
highly invested in one practice, they are likely to self-justify other similar behavior
(Cooper, 2007; Tavris and Aronson, 2015). The question for policy-makers
remains: how can people be supported to act in consonance with action they
perceive as high-cost?
which understands the behavior potentials (internal and external)
of local populations and encourages, facilitates and guides
local populations to act accordingly with their latent pro-
environmental attitudes. Indeed, participatory problem solving
of this kind has also been claimed to reduce helplessness (since it
helps people understand and explore problems) and thus induce
sustained and long-term pro-environmental behavior (Kaplan,
2000; see Jackson, 2005).
Applied Affordances
I have stated above that socio–ecological systems, everyday
environments included, are thoroughly infused with
affordances. To comprehend the full potential of affordances
in environmentally significant decision-making, it is worth
explicating how diverse the analysis and leveraging of affordances
can be. Here, scalability and adaptability are what truly make a
theory of affordances stand out from other theoretical models.8
Since affordances are systemic relations, an affordance is a
scalable heuristic applicable to whatever system we are interested
in observing. We can therefore choose to analyze affordances
from a nested order of systems (Gibson, 1979, see also Ostrom,
2005). This systemic nature of affordance theory makes it an
incredibly versatile analytical tool, basically applicable to any
area of interest of environmental policy. Consider, for example,
how we could choose to study affordances related to (1) objects
and everyday items, (2) households (3) urban environments or
(4) socioeconomic systems, and how this can inform us about
potential leverage points for environmental policy intervention.
These adaptations of affordances are briefly discussed below with
affordance-relative case studies.
Object-Level Affordances
Physical objects are perhaps the most intuitive of affordance-
relatable entities. As was the case in this article, introductions
to affordance theory usually begin with imagining what
functions objects afford for humans. It comes then as no
surprise that affordances of objects have been studied with
quite some detail, particularly by the design community. For
instance, in recent years several authors have published under
the umbrella-term of ‘design for sustainable behavior,’ which
(often drawing on the work of Norman) study how objects
afford pro-environmental behavior and how variables such as
understandability, ease of use and functional meaningfulness
affect sustainable product use (see e.g., Lockton et al., 2008;
Bhamra et al., 2011; Lockton, 2012; Selvefors, 2017). Often,
though, affordances are in this context generally defined
merely as properties of objects, a conception against which
I have argued in this text (in favor of affordances as
systemic animal–environment relations, see section “A Theory of
Affordances”).
8From other theoretical frameworks possibly relatable to affordance theory, I
can think of at least Giddens (1984) structuration theory, Lewin’s (1951) field
theory, Sen’s (1995) capability approach, practice theory (e.g., Bourdieu, 1990
and Shove et al., 2012), Paul Stern and colleague’s (Guagnano et al., 1995; Stern,
2000) attitude–behavior–context model, nudge theory from behavioral economics
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) as well as the whole discourse on ecosystem services
(see e.g., Danley and Widmark, 2016).
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A great example of objects affording sustainability can be
found in the Finnish bottle deposit-refund system, where each
bottle or can sold is placed with a deposit ranging from 10
to 40 cents added to the beverage’s retail price (PALPA, 2017).
The system gives consumers monetary incentive to recycle, since
the deposit is refunded when bottles and cans are returned
to stores and kiosks. The bottles afford a visual prompt for
recycling (overcoming the Gulf of Evaluation), and recycling
points are abundant (crossing the Gulf of Execution, since
each store that sells deposit-items is required to also receive
them).
Technically speaking, it is not the bottles and cans alone
which afford recycling here, but rather both the objects and the
whole recycling system they are embedded in. However, it is clear
that ‘recycling’ has become a prominent affordance (functional
meaning) which consumers perceive when encountering a
bottle or can in the Finnish culture. The deposit system has
been hugely successful, with the recycling rate of bottles and
cans ranging from 89 to 98%. Arguably, a point has also
been reached where the recycling system reinforces shared
expectations and social practices (in other terms, recycling has
become a social or cultural affordance), whereby deviations
from this norm are considered unacceptable (circa 90% of the
population sample self-reportedly always/often recycle bottles
and cans; Blom et al., 2010). However, I suspect the pro-
environmental affordance-potential is not used to its full capacity
in this case, since feedback from recycling mainly concerns
monetary benefits, and to a much lesser extent environmental
welfare.
Household Affordances
Abrahamse et al. (2007) acknowledge in their study on
energy consumption behavior, households are responsible for
a highly significant portion of greenhouse gas emissions, and
domestic environments should therefore be considered an
important target group for behavior change interventions. The
authors (Abrahamse et al., 2007, p. 266) note that whilst
knowledge itself predicts pro-environmental behavior rather
poorly, tailored information and feedback as well as feedforward
(in the form of goal setting) can be effective strategies
for encouraging energy conservation. This is particularly
the case with continuous electronic feedback, made possible
by digitalized energy systems. In Abrahamse et al.’s (2007)
study, experimental groups were given access to an online
website with information on energy consumption and related
ecological problems, along with a list of tailored energy-
saving measures and an online tool which could calculate
relevant and practical energy-saving means. Basically, the tool
gave simple and comparative feedback and feedforward on
how to reach the intended goal of 5% energy consumption
reduction. The 5-month long intervention resulted (among
a variety of other interesting findings) in the experimental
groups lowering their direct (gas, electricity and fuel) energy
consumption by 8.3% as opposed to the control group, whose
direct energy consumption increased by 0.4% (although indirect
energy consumption was not affected nearly as strongly as direct
energy use).
This would suggest, although the authors do not discuss
the results in terms of affordances, that when household
energy systems are designed to afford sustainable behavior (in
this case, by crossing the Gulf of Evaluation), they have the
potential to significantly strengthen pro-environmental behavior
patterns. Importantly, as opposed to a control group, the
intervention also resulted in heightened energy conservation
knowledge within the experimental groups, signaling potential
for a sustainable feedback loop, where not only heightened
explicit knowledge but also tacitly acquired practical ‘know-
how’ would further increase the ability to adopt more
sustainable consumption habits (see Darby, 2006). Affordance
theory also implies that the intervention would have likely
been even more effective had the Gulf of Execution and
Evaluation been crossed more efficiently: instead of using
a website (which must be accessed with significant intent)
the information could be ready-to-hand9 at a constantly
visible location within the household (e.g., an interactive
LCD-screen). With the dawn of smart energy systems in
digitalized domestic environments, such high pro-environmental
affordance systems could become mainstream in the near future.
This is potentially a big step forward from current electric
billing, which affords sustainable energy consumption behavior
particularly poorly due to technical and rare (e.g., quarter-
yearly) feedback and lack of prompts regarding how to change
behavior.
Urban Affordances
Marcus et al. (2016) explicitly discuss affordances in the context
of urban design. The authors note that ‘most approaches to
sustainable urbanism still share the conception of the humans–
environment relations that characterized modernism’ and
therefore do not emphasize the dynamical systemic properties
of urban environments. Instead, affordances could form the core
of a ‘new epistemological framework of the human–environment
relation in sustainable urbanism’ (Marcus et al., 2016, Abstract,
440). Against the backdrop of the Cartesian human–environment
dualism implicit in much of urban design, we should rather
advocate a dynamical and interactive two-way understanding
of the relations between humans and the urban environment.
Marcus et al. (2016, p. 445), in fact, go as far as recognizing that
‘cities, as the physical objects we generally envision them to be,
are also cognitive objects, that is, they are not something only
out there but also a type of extensions of the human mind.’ As
noted above, such ‘extended cognition’ follows naturally from
a dynamical systems understanding of affordances (Chemero,
2003, 2009; Rockwell, 2005; Anderson et al., 2012).
The transactional nature of affordances suggests that, when
designing urban environments, local attitudes and interests
should also be charted in an inclusive and even participatory
9The Heideggerian notion of ready-to-handedness (see Heidegger, 1927/1978) is
often implicit in ecological psychology (see e.g., Chemero, 2013). Being ‘ready-
to-hand,’ very briefly, implies that an object ‘is for’ (or affords) the achieving of
some function without the need for theorizing or other analytical activities. For
those familiar with behavioral economics, particularly nudge theory (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008) and Kahneman’s (2011) dual system approach, there is something
inherently System 1 (fast, automatic behavioral processes) in ready-to-handedness.
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process. In other words, affordances “cannot be imposed by
expertise themselves but need to consider the ‘meanings’ of
the local community” and “cannot be implemented as abstract
‘demands’ but have to cognitively engage and motivate people,
even if on a low key” (Marcus et al., 2016, p. 443). Kurz (2002,
p. 273) supports this idea by noting that financial rebates on
public transport systems are not sufficient if, for example, people
are more attuned to the social status their private vehicles afford
them with. Interestingly, Kurz’s notions on public transport
are supported by a study by Hunecke et al. (2001), which
suggests that an additive ‘economy-plus-moral’ (subway fare
plus normative ecological orientation, i.e., external plus internal)
formula best determines public transport travel choice in urban
environments. As discussed extensively above, environments do
not afford pro-environmental behavior alone, but always in
relation to human abilities and motivations.
Marcus et al. (2016, p. 446) also cite their previous work
(Giusti et al., 2014) to highlight the importance of green urban
affordances. The provision of green affordances (accessibility to
urban nature in Stockholm) for preschool children was shown
to lead to increased ecological knowledge and impact awareness,
as well as strengthened emotional connection with nature.
These internal factors, again, could be termed as further latent
potential for pro-environmental behavior. In this respect, urban
environments can ratchet cognitive processes: by redesigning
urban environments to reinforce sustainable affordances (e.g.,
accessibility to nature), we can promote a wealth of pro-
environmental identities and habits, which may over time
reinforce the transition toward a culture of sustainability.
In fact, the notion of the affordance could be extended
to include a whole socioeconomic system. This goes far
beyond the scope of this article, but (e.g., Sen’s, 1995)
capability approach has elaborated a very similar idea, where
abstractions such as ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ are assessed as
the actual capabilities (which relate to both individual physical
abilities, or ‘functionings’, and the system’s distribution of
action opportunities) of human-beings. In other words, even
concepts such as freedom, justice, equality can be assessed in
terms of functionally meaningful human–environment relations
(where the environment, of course, includes social, cultural and
economic determinants).
CONCLUSION
‘There is only one world, however, diverse, and all animals live
in it, although we human animals have altered it to suit ourselves.
We have done so wastefully, thoughtlessly, and, if we do not mend
our ways, fatally’ (Gibson, 1979, p. 130).
Affordance theory, as presented in this paper, studies the
dynamics of organism–environment systems and their evolution
over time. In this context, internal and external behavior
antecedents should not only be studied as interdependent
entities, but as a single, non-decomposable, evolutionary system
(Figure 1). In this respect, affordance theory particularly
helps us understand the ecology of environmentally significant
behavior. It has been proposed in this paper that those involved
with environmental policies adopt affordance theory as a
guiding heuristic for the design and implementation of pro-
environmental behavior change interventions. Several reasons
exist to as why this should be the case:
(1) Affordances can be understood to represent leverage points
for systemic behavior change interventions, since their
actualization can lead to large and self-reinforcing shifts in
environmentally significant behavior. Affordance theory,
as a dynamical systems approach, can therefore guide us to
conceptualize and identify leverage points which can help
individuals and socio–ecological systems to learn more
persistent sustainable habits. This second-order change
(helping the system learn) not only solves particular
individual problems, but also forms habits which apply to
the solution of classes of problems (Bateson, 2000, p. 274).
(2) By identifying and activating pro-environmentally
significant affordances in large enough numbers, we
can induce positive feedback loops (Figure 1), where,
for instance, changes in the material environment
reinforce pro-environmental identities and promote
pro-environmental sociocultural practices (which again
can lead to further modulation of the socio-material
environment, and so on). The reinforcement of these
feedback loops can further serve to normalize pro-
environmental habits as socio-culturally and materially
embodied practices.
(3) Affordance theory, as an ecological approach to behavior
analysis, helps us conceptualize and understand the lack
of fit between internal and external behavior antecedents.
Focus in policy interventions should be particularly
directed to domains where mismatches between internal
and external factors exist. One exemplary case is the
widely prevalent attitude–action gap, where latent pro-
environmental internal factors pre-exist but are not yet
actualized due to lack of affordances. The actualization
of pre-existing pro-environmental internal factors is also
more likely to lead to positive spillover effects than
other interventions (Truelove et al., 2014), making it a
particularly important leverage point.
(4) Affordance theory is a particularly useful and versatile
conceptual framework for policy interventions, since it
is, due to its systemic and nested nature, applicable to
practically any environmentally relevant policy-arena from
the sustainable design of objects and households to urban
environments.
This, I believe, presents us with a conceptual framework for
a systemic mending of our ways (in reference to Gibson above)
toward a sustainable future, where pro-environmental behavior
would emerge as a default path of least resistance and form
of life. Moreover, affordance theory has the potential to be a
participatory approach at that. A thorough understanding of
latent local behavior potential seems to call for participatory and
decentralized policy-making, with heightened understanding of
locally embedded meanings and local environments. This also
has the potential to increase the social and political acceptability
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of behavior change interventions (which ‘nudge’ interventions,
in particular, have struggled with, see e.g., Hukkinen, 2016) and
reduce helplessness in local populations. Whilst this mending
of our ways is by no means an easy task (and much is left
to be studied in how pro-environmental feedback loops can be
practically implemented) and not perhaps the radical systemic
change some commenters seem to call for (see e.g., Capstick
et al., 2015), there are reasons to be optimistic that little strokes
fell great oaks. After all, any organism–environment system is
necessarily infused with affordances, and by mending affordances
toward a self-reinforcing, less wasteful and thoughtless, direction
there is hope that our socio–ecological system will ultimately take
a sustainable turn.
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